The Chinese Train Control System Level 3 (CTCS-3) has been developed to ensure the safe and efficient operation of high-speed railway networks in China. Failure of the CTCS-3 may result in serious accidents, causing damage to assets and risking the safety of passengers. In this paper, the reliability evaluation of the CTCS-3, comprising an onboard and trackside subsystem, is conducted using the fault tree analysis where the basic events are divided into known failure rate basic events and unknown failure rate basic events. The probabilities of the occurrence of the known basic events are obtained from field data, while those of the unknown failure rate basic events are estimated by expert judgment. The fuzzy set theory is then adopted to deal with the imprecise expert judgment. Considering a specific operational scenario, to accomplish one mission, the failure probability of the CTCS-3 is calculated. Importance analysis is carried out not only to identify the critical basic events but also to provide suggestions on the improvement of preventive maintenance. Sensitivity analysis shows that hardware factors have the most significant effect on the reliability of the CTCS-3.
Introduction
The rapid development of railways, especially the high-speed railways, is changing the people's lives in China. Currently, more than 20,000 km of high-speed railways are being operated in the country. The Chinese Train Control System (CTCS), a significant part of railway signaling system, is accommodating all the rail lines. The CTCS, inspired from the European Train Control System (ETCS), has been developed for conventional and high-speed lines. The main objective of the CTCS is to avoid the train exceeding the limited speed or overrunning the safe distance. CTCS Level 3 (CTCS-3) is the highest application level in Chinese high-speed railway networks. 1 Previous studies have shown how important reliability analysis is for the safety and maintainability of railway networks. [2] [3] [4] [5] These studies focus on the hardware reliability analysis. However, CTCS-3, comprising an onboard and trackside subsystem, is a large and complex system with many interactive elements. 6 The influence factors on the performance of CTCS-3 are not only hardware but software, working environment and humans. In 2011, the accident involving a high-speed train collision in the YongWen line in China was caused by a hardware failure, software failure, lightning and human errors. Therefore, a new approach considering the synthetic effects of all these factors is highly needed for the reliability evaluation of CTCS-3. Failures occurring in the CTCS-3 may result in a delay, cost or accident. All failures adversely affect the system reliability, whereas some specific failures will have an adverse effect on safety within the particular application. 7 Since the consideration of safety analysis is outside the scope of this work, we only take the reliability aspects into account.
Used in a wide range of industries, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) has been known as a systematic approach for modelling the reliability and safety of complex systems. 8 It is also can be an option for the reliability evaluation of CTCS-3. However, a basic FTA needs the precise values of failure probabilities of basic events (BEs). CTCS-3 is newly developed and introduced, and hence maintenance data for estimating the occurrence probabilities of BEs are rather limited. Expert judgment is therefore used in practices to estimate the occurrence probabilities, but such kind of subjective method leads to imprecise inputs to FTA. To solve this problem, the fuzzy theory is integrated with FTA to develop a fuzzy FTA (FFTA) approach. [9] [10] [11] Such an approach has been extensively used in many engineering fields for system reliability and risk analysis. [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] For instance, Senol has developed an FFTA in the application of chemical cargo contamination and divided BEs into known failure rate BEs (KBEs) and unknown failure rate BEs (UBEs). 17 Mohsendokht 18 has combined the traditional method and fuzzy theory to obtain the failure probabilities of KBEs and UBEs, respectively. In railway applications, Jafarian and Rezvani 19 have adopted FFTA to evaluate the root causes for the derailment of passenger trains.
In this paper, the fuzzy approach also will be integrated with probabilistic methods, for obtaining the failure probabilities of KBEs and UBEs in a fault tree of a CTCS-3. And then, importance analysis will be carried out to identify the critical BEs and provide suggestions on the improvement for maintenance strategies. Sensitivity analysis will illustrate the effects of hardware, software, human error and working environment on the reliability of the CTCS-3.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces the application levels of CTCS and the structure of CTCS-3. Then, the general approach for obtaining the failure probabilities of BEs is presented. Importance and sensitivity analyses also proceed in this section. Next, a case study of reliability analysis of CTCS-3 will be conducted. Lastly, conclusions are provided in the final section.
The CTCS

Application levels of the CTCS
Due to the situation with different railway lines and diverse signaling equipment, the CTCS has been designed with five application levels. 20, 21 For each application level, various equipment and technical principles are utilized. Besides, different levels can be realized in one railway line, accomplishing downward compatibility and various demands. The five application levels are introduced as follows.
CTCS-0, strictly speaking, is a transition phase to the conventional railway lines. The train running on the conventional lines is equipped with universal cab signals, auxiliary signals to driver and traditional operation supervision system. The function of operation supervision system is to store the vital information (e.g. train braking characteristics and running conditions). The train control information gets transmitted from the traditional track circuits, designed many years ago, to the universal cab signals. In CTCS-0, the referential information for the driver mainly depends on lineside signals, which must be kept. Therefore, the driver plays an important role in the safe operation.
CTCS-1 is safer than CTCS-0 because the existing signal equipment and infrastructure have been enhanced and remolded. The onboard system consists of the subjective cab signal, a specific transmission module (STM) and an enhanced operation supervision system. Point equipment should be installed along the railway line to transmit fixed information. ZPW-2000 track circuits realize the train position and integrity detection and also transmit continuous train control information. The referential information for driver transfers from the lineside signals to subjective cab signals. In this level, the limited speed is 160 km/h. CTCS-2 is generally designed for the speed-raised lines, intercity lines and high-speed lines which are newly constructed or remolded. The lineside signals are optional in this level. The onboard system includes a vital computer (C2-VC), an STM, a Balise Transmission Module (BTM), a driver-machine interface (DMI) and so on. Based on the train characteristics and the information obtained from the speed sensor, BTM, and the STM, the C2-VC continuously supervises the real-time train speed. Besides, the information is displayed to the driver through DMI. Balises along the lines are used to transmit the fixed messages (e.g. the location, line profile, limited speed). ZPW-2000 track circuits transmit the continuous information. Based on the dispatching command and line profile, the train control center (TCC) generates the control information for the onboard system, delivered by the active balise and ZPW-2000 track circuits. In this level, the limited speed is 250 km/h. CTCS-3 is based on a wireless communication system (GSM-R) to realize the bidirectional continuous information transmission between the trackside and onboard subsystem. Through GSM-R, the train speed and location can get transmitted to the radio block center (RBC), meanwhile, the movement authorities, generated by RBC, can transmit to the onboard system. On the contrary, the lower level can only transmit the unidirectional information from the trackside to the onboard subsystem. ZPW-2000 track circuits realize the function of the train position and integrity detection. The temporary speed restriction server (TSRS) is used for the temporal speed restriction. In CTCS-3, the limited speed is 350 km/ h, and CTCS-2 is used as a backup system. CTCS-4, which can realize the moving block, is the future direction of the train control system. The train position and integrity detection can be achieved by the cooperation of RBC and the train itself. Therefore, the track circuits and lineside signals are no longer required. The trackside equipment reduces to minimum. Thus, CTCS-4 is considered as the next generation train control system.
A brief introduction on CTCS-3
CTCS-3, a radio-based train control system, consists of a trackside and onboard subsystem.
22,23 Figure 1 shows the structure of the CTCS-3. The physical architecture of the system is complex, and the function between the subsystem is interdependent. In the system reliability analysis, it is necessary to take consideration of all failures that bring delays to the railway lines or even damage to the passengers and infrastructures. Since transitions between CTCS-3 and CTCS-2 are possible, a CTCS-3 also includes the equipment of CTCS-2 system. A brief introduction on the equipment of CTCS-3 is given. Trackside subsystem is composed of the following parts.
1. RBC is a computer-based system that elaborates movement authorities to the train. RBC is the core element for data exchange with the onboard system. 2. TCC is a key element of the CTCS-2 system, generating the control information for the onboard system based on the message of track circuits, interlocking and limited speed. Each station has a TCC system. 3. TSRS accomplishes the function of transmitting the speed restrictions, generated by the centralized traffic control (CTC) or RBC. 4. GSM-R is the platform used for data exchange between the RBC and the onboard subsystem. 5. ZPW-2000 is a joint-less frequency-shift track circuit, achieving the train position and integrity detection. 6. Lineside electronic unit (LEU) is an electronic device, receiving message from the TCC and generating telegrams to be sent by active balises.
In order to control the train with permitted movement authorities, the onboard subsystem is equipped with the following devices.
CTCS-3 Vital Computer (C3-VC) is the core com-
puting system for preventing the train from overspeed or overrunning. 2. CTCS-2 Vital Computer (C2-VC) is the core computing system when the transition from CTCS-3 to CTCS-2 is accomplished. 3. Radio transmission unit (RTU) is used for processing the messages, received or transmitted by the radio station of signal (RSS). 4. BTM is designed for processing the telegrams, received by BTM antenna. 5. Track circuit reader (TCR) receives the messages from the TCR antenna and transmits the messages to C2-VC. 6. Train interface unit (TIU) is the interface to exchange information and issue commands between the onboard system and the braking system of the train. 7. Speed and distance processing unit (SDP) is for measuring the speed and distance. 8. DMI provides an interaction between the driver and the train, realizing manual procedures. 9. Juridical recorder unit (JRU) stores the important information and operational data.
Research methodology
Reliability evaluation of CTCS-3 starts from field data analysis and failure identification. Based on corrective maintenance, field data have been collected. Failure mode/effect/cause/classification is analyzed by the field data. FTA is then constructed based on expert experience and group discussion. Moreover, the BEs in the fault tree will be categorized as KBEs and UBEs. The failure probabilities of the two types of BEs are estimated to calculate the unreliability of the system. Lastly, importance and sensitivity analyses will proceed. The framework of the proposed approach is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Field data analysis and fault tree construction
According to field data, the failure modes and failure causes can be utilized to the construction of fault tree. Meanwhile, the failure time and maintenance time have been recorded, which can be used for calculating the failure probability. Failure classifications include hardware failure, software failure, working environment and human errors. It should be mentioned that the field data are related to specific railway lines and operational environment. Table 1 shows the partial specification of field data. After analyzing the field data, the fault tree is constructed, and the CTCS-3 failure is considered as the top event of the fault tree. Two assumptions actually exist in building the fault tree:
1. The BEs are mutually independent. 2. The failures of BEs in CTCS-3 follow the exponential distribution.
A probabilistic method to calculate the failure probabilities of KBEs
By corrective maintenance, field data are available for calculating the failure probabilities of KBEs. In this paper, three states should be involved in the operational phase. from 300 km/h to 200 km/h, but the train does not stop. And usually, the CTCS-2 can recover to CTCS-3 automatically if the wireless communication reconnected. This degraded state is not considered as a faulty state when analyzing the field data. 3. Waiting state: CTCS-3 is in this state when a subsystem is power off and waiting for operation. We assume that the CTCS-3 in a waiting state cannot transit to faulty state.
For high-speed trains, overhauls are necessary. The CTCS-3 onboard system is in a waiting state while an overhaul is in process. Such waiting time is not considered in our reliability analysis.
After analyzing the field data in operational phase, we can get the mean time between failure (MTBF), meaning the expectation of working time for each BE between failures.
The MTBF of BEs is calculated as follows
where t i is the ith working time in the observation time T. N i is the total number of failure of BE i in the observation time T. N m is the total number of the subsystem m.
Since failures follow the exponential distribution, the failure rate of the BE i is
Considering a specific operational scenario, the failure probabilities of KBEs are obtained by equation (3).
A fuzzy approach for the calculation of the failure probabilities of UBEs
For UBEs, such as rare events or human errors, which have little or incomplete data, expert judgments have been used to estimate their occurrence probabilities.
A fuzzy approach is utilized to deal with the ambiguity of expert judgments. Zadeh firstly introduced the concept of the fuzzy set, which can be represented by a membership function. 24 By definition, if X is a collection of objects denoted generically by x, then a fuzzy setÃ is
where ÃðxÞ is the membership function.
In this paper, we adopt the triangular fuzzy number, represented by the triplet ða, b, cÞ, a4b4c and the membership function is 
where a, b and c are the real numbers. Then, there are four steps in the proposed approach to generate the failure probabilities of the UBEs.
Step 1: Collect linguistic values of expert judgments. Questionnaires are sent to experts for collecting their attitude about the occurrence probabilities of BEs. Expert judgments are influenced by their education, experience, and age. Therefore, every expert should own different weighting scores. The weighting factors of experts are shown in Table 2 .
In this paper, there are seven linguistic values, namely very low (VL), low (L), fairly low (FL), medium (M), fairly high (FH), high (H), and very high (VH). Moreover, each linguistic value possesses its own triangular fuzzy number, as shown in Table 3 .
The corresponding membership functions for the linguistic values are shown in Figure 3 .
Step 2: Generate the membership function of a BE. The next step is to generate the membership function of each BE. The expert judgment can be represented by a matrix of A where m is the number of BEs, n is the number of experts and ij is the triangular fuzzy number of the BE i given by an expert j. The weight score of an expert is
where w i is the weighting score of expert i, n is the number of experts. Therefore, the final membership function of the BE can be calculated by
where B is a m Â 1 matrix.
Step 3: Defuzzify membership functions into crisp possibility scores. The objective of this step is to defuzzify membership functions, obtained in step 2, and calculate the crisp possibility score (CPS) that is an important outcome for decision-making. The process of defuzzification is to convert the fuzzy numbers into a scalar quantity. Apparently, there are many existing methods for defuzzification (e.g. centroid method, mean max membership, weighted average method, center of largest area). 25 In this paper, the center of area method is adopted by the following expression.
where X Ã is defuzzified output and x is output variable. Step 4: Convert the CPS into failure probability of a BE. In this step, the goal is to generate the failure probability of a BE from CPS. By using the method proposed by Onisawa, one can calculate the failure probability of a BE as follows
where,
Â2:301 ð11Þ
Importance and sensitivity analyses
According to the analysis above, both the failure probabilities of KBEs and UBEs have been calculated. Therefore, the failure probability of the top event can be obtained. Moreover, we would like to carry out importance and sensitivity analyses to identify which BEs are critical. Several importance measures have been developed to acquire the importance information of a BE. 27 In this paper, the Fussell-Vesely importance measure (F-VIM) is adopted to rank the influence of a BE on the whole system. And the calculation of F-VIM is performed as follows
where I FV i is the importance measure of the BE i;P TE is the occurrence probability of the top event; and P x i ¼0 TE is the occurrence probability with the BE i to be perfectly reliable.
Sensitivity analysis illustrates the variation of top event occurrence probability, given the changes in the failure probabilities of BEs. In this paper, the system sensitivity analysis is performed with the assumption that the failure probabilities of each classification vary by AE10%.
Case study Fault tree of the CTCS-3
In the case study, the system contains five onboard subsystems, five TCCs, three RBCs and two TSRSs. The specification of operational scenario is shown in Table 4 .
Considering the operational scenario, the fault trees have been constructed by expert experience and group discussion, as shown in Figures 4 to 8 . The description and classification of BEs are shown in Table 6 .
Estimating the failure probabilities of KBEs based on field data
Field data provided by the Guangzhou railway bureau between January 2010 and December 2013 are used. As mentioned above, the field data have been analyzed and the total number of faulty state has been calculated, as shown in Figure 9 . We take the onboard subsystem as an example. The number of electrical multiple unit (EMU) train is 89, meaning that the data are collected from 89 CTCS-3 onboard subsystems. Considering the effects of overhauls of a high-speed train, the average time for the waiting state of an onboard subsystem is 6 h in a day.
For instance, the fault number of DMI failure (E11) is 43. Meanwhile, the observation time, corresponding to the total time, is 26,298 h. The total maintenance time is 963 min, corresponding to 16 h. According to equation (1), the MTBF of E11 is
Therefore, we can get the failure rate of E11 by equation (2) .
From equation (3), the failure probability of BE E11 in one mission is
Through this method, the failure probabilities of other KBEs have been obtained.
Calculating failure probabilities of UBEs by fuzzy approach
Since there is a lack of reliability data for the UBEs, the proposed fuzzy approach is utilized. In this paper, 10 experts are consulted to state their own judgment for those BEs. Obviously, heterogeneous experts have different weighting scores. The failure probabilities of BEs E17 and E31 have been calculated as an example. The expert weighting scores and corresponding judgment of E17 and E31 are shown in Table 5 . According to Table 3 and equation (8), the fuzzy numbers of E17 and E31 have been calculated as follows Finally, the failure probability of E17 and E31 is generated by using equation (10) .
The complete failure probabilities of UBEs are shown in Table 6 .
Results and discussion
Occurrence probability of the top event. Through the abovementioned analysis, the whole occurrence probabilities of BEs are obtained, as shown in Table 6 .
Every BE is a cut set in calculation of the occurrence probability of top event. Under the operational scenario, the occurrence probability of the top event is 0.01048, meaning that the probability to complete the mission is 0.98952, assuming that one railway bureau has four high-speed lines, which has eight missions in one high-speed line. The result can be obtained when the occurrence of faulty state is in about three days. We have consulted several maintainers who are working in the railway bureau to validate the result. Meanwhile, we analyzed the maintenance data of the 2015 Guangzhou railway bureau; the total number of faulty states is 81, meaning the incidents occurred in about five days. Therefore, the result is reasonable for the actual situation.
Importance analysis. F-VIM is conducted to analyze the criticalities of BEs. The railway bureau should pay more attention on the BEs that occupy high F-VIM. Meanwhile, in the operational phase, the maintenance strategy should refer to the F-VIM of BEs. According to equation (12) , the F-VIM of BEs has been calculated, as shown in Table 6 .
We can find that E1, E3, E8, E12, E14, E15, E17, E19, E24, E31, E35, and E40 have high F-VIM values. The F-VIM values of the onboard and trackside subsystem are 0.657 and 0.343, respectively. For the whole CTCS-3, the RBC, TCC and TSRS work indoors where owns well operation environment. Nevertheless, the onboard subsystem works outdoors that has relatively uncertainty and dynamic operation environment. Therefore, the railway bureau should pay more attention on the maintenance of the onboard subsystem.
Considering the whole CTCS-3, the highest F-VIM is E1, corresponding to the C3-VC software failure. At the beginning of the operation of the high-speed railway, the C3-VC software failure often causes CTCS-3 to a faulty state. Generally, the C3-VC software failure is caused by inconsistent states of output. The software failure can be fixed and improved by analyzing the field data of C3-VC. Therefore, the railway bureau should record those failures to update and improve the software of the onboard system.
The hardware failures of the onboard subsystem, such as E12 (interface relay failure), E14 (Radar failure) or E15 (speed sensor failure), are mainly attributed to unreasonable hardware design and unqualified installation technology. Therefore, the railway bureau should For the trackside subsystem, the highest F-VIM is E31, corresponding to the lightning influence. The lightning influence cannot be eliminated. But, it makes sense that the railway bureau utilizes more technology to decrease the lightning influence to trackside equipment. Moreover, the TCC software failure, LEU failure, and active balise failure should be paid more attentions in the trackside subsystem maintenance.
Sensitivity analysis. The occurrence probabilities of the top event are calculated by changing the failure probabilities of each classification. The effects of changes in hardware, software, human error, and working environment are shown in Figure 10 . The hardware factors have the most significant effect on the reliability of the CTCS-3. Human error and working environment have little effect, whereas software factors are in between. In the operational phase, hardware failure, especially in the onboard subsystem should be allocated more maintenance resource.
Conclusion
It is well known that the reliability of CTCS-3 plays a significant part in the safe and efficient operation of a railway system. After a brief introduction to CTCS, this paper presented a reliability evaluation of the whole CTCS-3 by using FTA, and combined the probabilistic method and fuzzy method to calculate the failure probabilities of BEs. To develop the method, the corrective maintenance data from the Guangzhou railway bureau have been analyzed. Considering a specific operational scenario of the CTCS-3, fault trees have been constructed using expert experience and group discussion. Based on the results obtained, the following conclusions have been drawn:
1. The method proposed is adaptive to the reliability evaluation of the whole CTCS-3, including an onboard and trackside subsystem. In the operation and maintenance phase, more attention should be given on the maintenance of the onboard subsystem. 2. For a specific operational scenario, the reliability of the CTCS-3 to complete one mission is 0.98952. The results are validated by analyzing the field data of the Guangzhou railway bureau. 3. The results obtained from the importance analysis indicate that the critical BEs, such as C3-VC software failure, BSA permanent error, wireless communication related, interface relay failure and so on need to be allocated more maintenance resource. 4. As a complex system, the importance of hardware failure, software failure, human error, and working environment has been measured. Sensitivity analysis shows that hardware factors have the most significant effect on the reliability of the CTCS-3.
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